Fordham Law Review
Volume 87

Issue 2

Article 10

2018

Totally Class-Less?: Examining Bristol-Myer's Applicability to
Class Actions
Justin A. Stone
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Justin A. Stone, Totally Class-Less?: Examining Bristol-Myer's Applicability to Class Actions, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 807 (2018).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss2/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

TOTALLY CLASS-LESS?:
EXAMINING BRISTOL-MYERS’S
APPLICABILITY TO CLASS ACTIONS
Justin A. Stone*
In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court tightened the specific jurisdiction
doctrine when it dismissed several plaintiffs’ claims in a mass tort action
against pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The action was brought in a California state court and
involved several hundred plaintiffs alleging that they were injured by Plavix,
a drug BMS manufactures. The Supreme Court held that California could
not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over BMS as to the
nonresident plaintiffs, who did not have an independent connection to
California. While the nonresident plaintiffs argued that California had
specific jurisdiction because their claims were identical to the California
residents’ claims (with the only difference being that their experience with
Plavix occurred in other states), the Court held that these claims did not arise
out of BMS’s contacts with California, but rather out of BMS’s contacts with
the particular states in which these plaintiffs were injured. In so holding, the
Court emphasized that enabling California to exercise jurisdiction in this
context would infringe on the sovereignty of other states—more specifically,
the states who housed the nonresident plaintiffs involved in the action. This
Note explores whether class actions should be bound by this decision. The
fundamental question, then, is whether class actions are meaningfully
distinguishable from mass tort actions such that they avoid Bristol-Myers’s
reach.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate defendants recently obtained a huge win in the U.S. Supreme
Court, but the scope of the victory remains unclear. On June 19, 2017, in an
8–1 decision, the Court held that the state of California lacked jurisdiction
over the nonresident plaintiffs involved in a mass tort lawsuit.1 Brought in a
California state court against the pharmaceutical behemoth Bristol-Myers
Squibb (BMS), the case involved hundreds of plaintiffs alleging that the
BMS drug Plavix had damaged their health.2 BMS filed a motion to dismiss
the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the plaintiffs who had no
connection to California. Reversing the Supreme Court of California, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito, ruled in favor
of BMS. The Court held that—although the nonresident plaintiffs brought
identical claims to those plaintiffs who were prescribed the drug in
California, ingested the drug in California, and were injured by the drug in
California—California could not constitutionally exercise territorial
jurisdiction over them.3 In so holding, the Court left open the question at the
center of this Note: whether, in class action lawsuits, personal jurisdiction
exists for members of the class that have no connection to the forum state in
which the action is brought.
Part I of this Note first describes the landscape of personal jurisdiction and,
more specifically, the landscape as it relates to corporations. It then examines
more closely the Bristol-Myers opinion itself by scrutinizing the purported
reasoning behind the Court’s decision, explaining how the decision alters the
personal jurisdiction landscape, and surveying the law concerning the
relationship between personal jurisdiction and class actions prior to the
decision. Finally, it briefly defines the different types of class actions and
compares them to the mass actions of the sort involved in Bristol-Myers.
Part II examines eight recent decisions that analyze the applicability of
Bristol-Myers to class actions. This Part exemplifies the disparate
approaches courts have used in applying Bristol-Myers to the class action
context. Part III concludes that Bristol-Myers should not be extended to class
actions as they are meaningfully distinguishable from the type of action
brought in Bristol-Myers.
1. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1781.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Personal Jurisdiction Before and After Bristol-Myers
Personal jurisdiction is guided by the Due Process Clause found in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits a state from
exercising jurisdiction over a defendant if such an exercise would
inappropriately exceed the reach of that state’s sovereignty.4 There are two
types of power through which a state can exercise personal jurisdiction over
an individual: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.5 If a state has
general jurisdiction over an individual, that individual can be sued in that
state regardless of the specific claim at hand.6 If a state has only specific
jurisdiction over an individual, that individual can be sued in that state only
if her contacts with the state give rise to the individual’s specific claim at
hand.7 Personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, can be
waived by consent.8 Plaintiffs consent to personal jurisdiction when they
sue.9 Defendants can consent either through an affirmative statement of
consent or by proceeding with the actions against them without objecting to
jurisdiction.10
As every first-year law student at some point discovers, the current state
of the personal jurisdiction doctrine was first established in the Supreme
Court’s seminal decision, International Shoe Co. v. Washington.11 In
response to the increasing corporate population, the Court provided the
following oft-quoted guideline:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”12

International Shoe also drew a distinction between two types of personal
jurisdiction—a dichotomy that laid the foundation for the doctrines of
general and specific jurisdiction.13 In a more eloquent diction, the Court
explicitly acknowledged that a defendant may be subject to suit in a particular
forum either because (1) the defendant had such substantial contacts with the
forum that the defendant could be sued there, regardless of whether the
plaintiff’s claim relates to those contacts; or (2) the defendant’s contacts with
4. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945).
5. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703 (stating that “an individual may submit to
the jurisdiction of the court by appearance”).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B).
11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
13. Id. at 318.
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the forum state, irrespective of substantiality, gave rise to the plaintiff’s
claim.14
Following International Shoe, the extent to which plaintiffs could forum
shop by arguing that a corporate defendant is subject to general jurisdiction
in every state in which it conducts substantial business operations remained
unclear.15 Over the last few years, however, the Court has narrowed the
doctrine of general jurisdiction tremendously, at least insofar as it relates to
corporate defendants.16 In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown,17 the Court made clear that a state may not assert general jurisdiction
over the foreign subsidiaries of a corporation simply by virtue of the latter
being subject to such jurisdiction.18 In Daimler AG v. Bauman,19 the Court
narrowed the doctrine further when it indicated that a state may exercise
general jurisdiction over a corporation only if the corporation (1) is
incorporated in the state attempting to exercise general jurisdiction, or (2) has
established its principal place of business in the state attempting to exercise
general jurisdiction.20 The Court did not completely limit the exercise of
general jurisdiction to these two options and acknowledged that there may be
extraordinary circumstances in which a state could assert general jurisdiction
over a corporation that is neither incorporated nor headquartered there.21
However, since Daimler, no such circumstance has arisen, and no state has
successfully exercised general jurisdiction over a corporation unless one of
those two conditions was satisfied.
Accordingly, Bristol-Myers analyzed the California court’s exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction over BMS since, after Daimler, California had
no claim to general jurisdiction despite BMS’s substantial contacts with the

14. Id.
15. See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the
National Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1356–57 (2005)
(noting that, in 2005, “[l]ower courts and scholars have not reached a consensus as to the
number and type of contacts necessary to establish general jurisdiction over unrelated
claims”). Compare Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418–
19 (1984) (holding that Texas could not assert general jurisdiction over the defendant despite
the defendant’s substantial business contacts with the state), with Rush v. Savchuck, 444 U.S.
320, 330 (1980) (stating, in dicta, that Minnesota and every other state could assert general
jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of the defendant having conducted business in all
fifty states).
16. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
17. 564 U.S. 915.
18. See id. at 919–20.
19. 134 S. Ct. 746.
20. Id. at 760. The “principal place of business” is a corporation’s headquarters. See Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92 (2010).
21. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. The Court said this with Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) in mind. In Perkins, the Court held that Ohio could properly
assert general jurisdiction over the defendant-corporation, which was neither headquartered
nor incorporated in Ohio, because the defendant had, due to World War II, temporarily moved
all of its business operations to Ohio. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.
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state.22 To assert specific jurisdiction, as the doctrine stands today, a plaintiff
must satisfy three prongs by showing that (1) the defendant has purposefully
availed itself of the forum state; (2) the plaintiff’s claim or claims arise out
of or relate to such contacts with the state (i.e., arise out of such purposeful
availment); and (3) it would be reasonable for the forum state to exercise
jurisdiction in the case at hand.23
In Bristol-Myers, neither the Court nor BMS contested that BMS had
purposefully availed itself of the California market.24 Not only did BMS
have a laboratory in California, it marketed Plavix to the California
population and generated over $900 million from California sales of Plavix
at the time of the case.25 Further, neither the Court nor BMS contested
jurisdiction as to the California plaintiffs.26 However, the Court did dismiss
the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction.27
The Bristol-Myers action was brought by 678 plaintiffs, 592 of whom were
not residents of California.28 The Court reasoned that the non-Californians’
claims neither related to nor arose out of BMS’s contacts with California
because, unlike the California plaintiffs, these plaintiffs were never
prescribed Plavix in California; never ingested Plavix in California; and were
never injured by Plavix in California. Nor did BMS conduct research on, or
develop, the drug in California.29 The plaintiffs’ assertion that their claims
did relate to BMS’s contacts with California was centered on the fact that
their claims were identical to those brought by the California plaintiffs—the
only difference, of course, being that their experience with Plavix occurred
in states other than California.30 Thus, the Court answered a question it had
never before answered concretely and determined that, when assessing
whether a court has territorial jurisdiction in a mass tort action, the court must
examine each plaintiff’s claim individually. Consequently, just three years
after tightening the requirements for general jurisdiction, the Court doubled
down with a more stringent analysis of specific jurisdiction. The extent to
which the specific jurisdiction doctrine has been narrowed for class actions,
however, is yet to be determined. As Justice Sotomayor, the lone dissenter

22. Interestingly, the California Court of Appeal initially upheld jurisdiction under a
theory of general jurisdiction, but subsequently amended its position to a theory of specific
jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).
23. Id. at 1785–86 (“Our cases have set out three conditions for the exercise of specific
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”).
24. Id. at 1786.
25. Id. at 1778.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1781.
30. Id. The plaintiffs also argued that California could exercise specific jurisdiction
because BMS had a contract with a California distributor to distribute Plavix nationwide. The
Court rejected this argument. Id. at 1783. While illustrative of the Court’s narrow approach
to specific jurisdiction, that argument is not relevant for the purposes of this Note.
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in Bristol-Myers, emphasized, whether the Court’s holding extends to class
actions remains to be seen.31
Interestingly, while the Court’s clear recognition of the plaintiffs’ failure
to satisfy the second prong appeared sufficient to overturn the California
court, the Court continued with what appeared to be a reasonableness (or
third prong) analysis.32 The Court understood that in terms of efficiency and
convenience—factors often considered in a reasonableness inquiry—
dismissing these claims would be counterproductive since it would spawn
several lawsuits around the country as opposed to resolving the claims with
a single lawsuit.33 However, the Court focused on what it believed was a
more pressing concern:
Assessing [the] burden on [the defendant in litigating in a certain forum]
obviously requires a court to consider the practical problems resulting from
litigating in the forum, but it also encompasses the more abstract matter of
submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate
interest in the claims in question. As we have put it, restrictions on personal
jurisdiction “are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States.”34

“‘The sovereignty of each State,’” the Court continued, “‘implie[s] a
limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States.’ And at times, this
federalism interest may be decisive.”35 The Court concluded that this
“federalism interest” cannot be overcome by the forum state’s interest in
asserting its power over the particular defendant, or by the convenience or
efficiency that would result if such jurisdiction was allowed—lest the Due
Process Clause be violated.36
B. Class Actions
In arguing that the Court should exercise jurisdiction over BMS, California
pointed to the Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,37 which
proceeded through a money-damage class action.38 Shutts is an important
case because it represents the only time the Supreme Court focused on this
relationship between personal jurisdiction and class actions. In that case, the
defendant, Phillips Petroleum (“Phillips”), argued that the Court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident class members who had no
31. See id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court today does not confront
the question whether its opinion here would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff
injured in the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom
were injured there.”).
32. Actually, the Court did not explicitly separate its analysis into three prongs, but its
analysis does follow the typical trajectory of this multipronged approach. Justice Sotomayor
did break her analysis down into the three prongs in her dissent. Id. at 1785–86.
33. See id. at 1780 (majority opinion).
34. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
35. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
36. See id.
37. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
38. See id. at 801.
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connection to Kansas, the forum state.39 Although initiating an action
constitutes consenting to personal jurisdiction, Phillips argued that the
nonresident, unnamed class members could not be said to have consented
since they had a minimal role in bringing the suit.40 Indeed, many members
of the class probably did not even realize they were part of an action against
Phillips, as they were only given an opportunity to opt out rather than an
opportunity to affirmatively opt into the action.41 In dismissing Phillips’s
objection, the Court explained that the traditional personal jurisdiction due
process analysis that applies to defendants does not apply to plaintiffs.42
However, the Court made clear that in money-damage class actions such as
this one, to avoid due process issues the unnamed class members must
receive notice of the suit, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to
affirmatively opt out of the class.43
The Bristol-Myers Court, though, rejected California’s reliance on Shutts,
emphasizing that Shutts involved a decision regarding the “due process rights
of plaintiffs.”44 The case in front of it, on the other hand, implicated the
traditional “minimum contacts” analysis used to consider territorial
jurisdiction over defendants.
A class action is “a form of representative litigation” in which “[o]ne or
more class representatives litigate on behalf of many absent class members,
and those class members are bound by the outcome of the representative’s
litigation.”45 As such, class actions are the exception to the due process
notion that an individual cannot be bound by a decision to which she is not a
named party.46 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the class action
certification process in federal court.47 Rule 23(a) dictates the following
prerequisites that need to be satisfied to obtain certification:
(1) the class [must be] so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there [must be] questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties [must be]
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative
parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.48

39. Id. at 802–04.
40. Id. at 806.
41. Id. at 801.
42. Id. at 808.
43. Id. at 811–12.
44. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
45. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (5th ed. 2011).
46. See id.
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For purposes of this Note, I will use Rule 23 to give the background
of class actions. The Class Action Fairness Act dramatically relaxed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)’s
diversity requirement vis-à-vis class actions and enabled defendants to remove any state class
action to federal court as long as “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2012). However, it should be
noted that, although many states do not distinguish between different class action categories,
the following analysis can likely be applied to many state court class actions as well.
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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Rule 23 recognizes four types of class actions—a crucial delineation for
purposes of this Note.49 There are two types contemplated in 23(b)(1), one
in 23(b)(2), and one in 23(b)(3).50 The first type of class action is governed
by 23(b)(1)(A) and is used when prosecution of “separate actions by or
against individual members of the class would create a risk of incompatible
standards of conduct for the adverse party due to inconsistent or varying
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class.”51 This
category is rarely used and generally does not cover class action suits that
seek money damages.52 Rather, it is for those situations in which
contradictory adjudicatory outcomes in individual cases would leave the
defendant unsure of how to act.53 For example, if the holders of a bond sued
to have the bond deemed invalid, and some won and some lost, the defendant
would not know the status of his obligations.54 This category of class action
is sensibly referred to as an “incompatible-standards” class action.55
The next type of class action is governed by 23(b)(1)(B), which states that
a class action may be maintained . . . if: prosecuting separate actions by or
against individual class members would create a risk of . . . adjudications
with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would
be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.56

The paradigmatic example of this category occurs when numerous people are
likely to sue a defendant individually, but the defendant’s funds are likely
insufficient to satisfy all judgments against it.57 A class action under this
category ensures fairness by awarding each member of the class a pro rata
share of the defendant’s available funds.58 This type of class action is
appropriately termed the “limited-fund” class action.59
Rule 23(b)(2), which dictates the third type of class action, permits a class
action if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole.”60 Money damages are generally not available in this category.61
This is typically used when a group of people is seeking structural injunctive

49. Id. r. 23(b).
50. Id.
51. Id. r. 23(b)(1)(A); see also 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1.
52. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
57. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
61. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338, 365–67 (2011).
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relief, or some other form of relief that is not monetary.62 This category of
class action is commonly referred to as an “injunctive” class action. It is
frequently employed in the field of civil rights and, accordingly, is also often
referred to as a “civil rights” class action.63
The final class action category is found in 23(b)(3), which permits a class
action if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”64 To sufficiently satisfy
the predominance requirement needed to get a 23(b)(3) class certified, the
class must demonstrate that individualized issues of law or fact will not
predominate at trial.65 To satisfy the superiority requirement, the class must
show that representative litigation presents a superior form of litigation than
potential alternatives—such as proceeding through several individual actions
or proceeding through the joinder mechanism (where all parties are named in
the lawsuit).66 This category is often referred to as the “money-damage”
class action.67 It is thus labeled because it is the class action most frequently
employed when seeking money damages.68 Naturally, the money-damage
class action is a category for which certification is frequently sought.
As for opt-out and notice rights in class actions, they are only mandatory
in money-damage class actions.69 Providing notice to unnamed class
members in 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions is discretionary because, as
explained later, constitutional due process concerns are not as prevalent in
these class action types.70 In addition, class members in 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(2) actions often do not have the option to opt out of the class, as is also
explained more thoroughly below.71
There are four central objectives of the class action.72 They can be
described in terms of compensation, deterrence, efficiency, and legitimacy.73
Class actions are effectively the only way individuals with claims for small
amounts of money can seek redress in court.74 People with such claims will
not find pursuing individual actions worth their time, as the legal fees would
almost assuredly exceed the amount that could be recovered in court.75
62. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1.
63. See id.
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Torres v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 629, 635 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The
narrow issue in this case is whether the Plaintiffs may prove RICO causation through common
proof such that individualized issues will not predominate at trial. The import of this inquiry
is whether class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).”).
66. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:64.
67. Id. § 4:1.
68. Id.
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); id. r. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A); see also infra Part III.
71. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, §§ 4:2, 4:26; see also infra Part III.
72. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, §§ 1:7–:10.
73. Id.
74. See id. § 1:7.
75. See id.
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Indeed, an attorney faced with such a client would be hesitant to even take
the case.76 However, the unique procedural mechanics of a class action allow
small-claim plaintiffs to obtain compensation by allowing a group of people
with the same claim to consolidate their claims into a single action.77
Moreover, the aggregation of plaintiffs into one lawsuit actually increases
compensation by reducing the fees and costs associated with initiating and
proceeding with a lawsuit individually.78
In the same vein, class actions also serve a deterrent effect.79 As just
discussed, when the harm of a defendant’s conduct is dispersed such that
each harmed individual only has a claim for a small sum of money, no
individual suit is likely to arise.80 Accordingly, the defendant is free to
continue engaging in tortious activity since it does not have to pay for it.81
The defendant is externalizing costs that should be internalized.82 Class
actions provide for such internalization, as they hold defendants accountable
for their conduct.83 With the threat of a class action always looming,
defendants will be more likely to absorb the costs that are associated with
conforming their conduct to the law.84
Class actions also provide a deterrent effect by enabling a greater amount
of nonmonetary litigation.85 An individual plaintiff who seeks injunctive
relief often sees her case mooted and, therefore, dismissed.86 Consequently,
the next similarly situated plaintiff is left without a remedy. Acknowledging
this problem, the Supreme Court has held that a certified class may possess
Article III standing whether or not the named plaintiff’s claim has been
mooted, as long as at least one member of the class still possesses a justiciable
claim.87 By enabling such suits, private legal enforcement is expanded and
wrongdoing further deterred.88

76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. § 1:8.
80. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
81. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 1:8.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that public agencies cannot
themselves detect and deter all wrongdoing. Private suits are an important complement to
public enforcement.”). For example, the Court once noted that “[w]hen the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation
would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance
with the law.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (per curiam).
85. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 1:8.
86. This proposition is applicable to mooted class action cases that are not already subject
to the mootness exception, that is, those cases that are “capable of repetition yet evading
review.” See id. (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S.
498, 514–15 (1911)).
87. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) (holding that a named plaintiff’s claim
may proceed regardless of whether her claim has been mooted, so long as some class
member’s claim is still justiciable).
88. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 1:8.
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Class actions also promote efficiency.89 They do so by consolidating
actions and enabling representative litigation.90 It requires less time and is
less expensive to proceed through one lawsuit than through several.91 As the
Supreme Court put it, “[A]n absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do
anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content
in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection.”92 Thus,
class actions preserve both judicial resources and litigants’ resources.93
Class actions are especially economical when the class members individually
have large claims against a defendant, such that each member would pursue
the action individually, that is, with or without the class action option.94 In
these situations, courts would be faced with a number of repetitive actions if
a class action was not permitted.95 Conversely, as just explained, small-claim
individuals might not litigate at all without the advantages of a class action.96
Thus, it could be argued that, in these situations, class actions are inefficient,
as they create the expenditure of time and resources that would otherwise not
occur.97 However, even in these situations, class actions, as also outlined
above, provide a deterrent effect that forces would-be defendants to act more
socially efficient by internalizing costs that should belong to them and not
imposing them on others.98 This internalization inducement prevents both
public and private lawsuits from occurring in the first place, thereby not only
preserving judicial resources, but also preserving resources consumed by
public enforcement.99
Finally, class actions enhance the legitimacy of the judiciary by helping
prevent inconsistent results and thus promoting uniformity in the law.100
Class actions accomplish this objective by either preventing incompatible
standards or ensuring that claims predominated by the same issues of law and
fact are resolved the same way.101 Naturally, when two individual lawsuits
that share predominantly the same issues of law and fact are resolved
disparately, the legitimacy of the common law is threatened.102

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 1:9.
Id.
Id.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 1:9.
Id.
Id.
See id. § 1:10.
See id.
See id.
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C. Distinguishing Mass Actions
The plaintiffs in the Bristol-Myers litigation proceeded through a mass
action103 and, more specifically, a mass tort action.104 Mass actions, like
class actions, present a type of group litigation in which several plaintiffs
with similar claims consolidate their claims into one action.105 In BristolMyers, for example, a nationwide group of individuals consolidated their
allegations of injury by Plavix into one action in a California court.106
Unlike class actions, however, in mass actions every plaintiff is a named
plaintiff to the lawsuit. Otherwise stated, a mass action is not a form of
representative litigation.107 Moreover, as distinguished from class actions,
mass actions often present situations in which issues of fact or law are more
particularized among the group of plaintiffs.108 For example, in a mass tort
action like Bristol-Myers, the individual plaintiffs might have suffered
varying degrees of harm. More significantly, a defendant like BMS might
be able to prove lack of causation for some individuals (say, because of a
certain individual’s medical history, unhealthy lifestyle, or recent activity)
but not for others. Consequently, while the Supreme Court has not
categorically denied the ability of a group of people who have been injured
by a defendant’s widespread tortious conduct to form a class, it has indicated
that such certification will rarely occur.109 In Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor,110 the Court stated:
[M]ass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may, depending
upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement. The
Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that
“mass accident” cases are likely to present “significant questions, not only
of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, . . . affecting the
individuals in different ways.” And the Committee advised that such cases
are “ordinarily not appropriate” for class treatment. But the text of the Rule
does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification, and
District Courts, since the late 1970’s have been certifying such cases in
increasing number. The Committee’s warning, however, continues to call
for caution when individual stakes are high and disparities among class
members great.111

103. The term “mass action” is used in this Note to refer to aggregate litigation that is not
of the representational variety—or, in other words, aggregate litigation in which every
claimant is a named plaintiff.
104. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1777 (2017).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012).
106. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1777.
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (“[T]he term ‘mass action’ means any civil action
(except a [class action]) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed
to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law
or fact . . . .”).
108. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
109. Id.
110. 521 U.S. 591.
111. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s note to 1966 amendment).
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Amchem involved a group of plaintiffs attempting to certify a 23(b)(3)
class on the basis of asbestos-induced injuries.112 The Court denied
certification on the grounds that, inter alia, the individuals suffered varying
degrees of harm and “were exposed to different asbestos-containing
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different
periods.”113 Two years later, the Court again denied 23(b)(3) certification in
an asbestos case,114 thereby cementing its reluctant approach to certifying
money-damage class actions involving personal injury in a mass tort
context.115 That said, the Amchem Court suggested that “mass accident”
cases (i.e., cases that have “a single common event at their core”) might
satisfy the predominance requirement and therefore present situations
appropriate for 23(b)(3) class certification.116 An example of a “mass
accident” case is the class action lawsuit that arose after a Hyatt hotel’s
skywalk collapsed and injured several people.117 In that case, every class
member was injured by the same, single occurrence. Therefore, class
certification was deemed appropriate.118
In summary, a lawsuit might proceed through a mass action rather than a
class action because the harmed parties in a mass action are unable to
demonstrate either the prerequisites of a class action governed by 23(a) (or
their state equivalent) or, if such prerequisites can be satisfied, the
requirements demanded by the particular class action category sought by the
proposed class. There is no separate rule for mass actions like there is for
class actions. Rather, mass actions are governed by the permissive joinder
rules found in Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.119
II. RECENT CASE LAW EXAMINING BRISTOL-MYERS IN THE
CLASS ACTION CONTEXT
Despite the fact that Bristol-Myers was decided only in June 2017, several
courts had already applied it in the class action context within that calendar
year. A federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently
provided defendants with an encouraging answer. In Plumbers’ Local Union
No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp.,120 the court declined to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the claims of out-of-state class members.121 The
court decided this case fewer than five weeks after Bristol-Myers.122 This
case involved a class action in which the representative plaintiff was a

112. Id. at 597.
113. Id. at 624.
114. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 829–30 (1999).
115. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:62.
116. See id.; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625.
117. See In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 1982).
118. Id. at 1189.
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
120. No. 16-665, 2017 WL 3129147 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2017).
121. See id. at *6.
122. Compare id. at *1, with Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1773 (2017).
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plumbers’ union, headquartered in Pennsylvania, the forum state, which
provided a health insurance plan to its members, who individually span the
nation.123 The union alleged that the defendants, all pharmaceutical
companies, intentionally misrepresented the price of the drugs they sold to
prescription drug providers.124 The providers, in turn, distributed these drugs
to the union’s members and allegedly billed the union at an improperly
inflated price.125 The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
defendants as to the non-Pennsylvania claims.126 The court explained:
“Only Plumbers’ Pennsylvania Claims arise out of or relate to . . .
Defendants’ sales of generic drugs in Pennsylvania . . . . Accordingly, the
Court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over the Non-Pennsylvania
Claims . . . .”127
However, while the court cited Bristol-Myers once in the decision to
support its definition of specific jurisdiction,128 it did not distinguish between
the mass action brought in Bristol-Myers and the class action before it. In
fact, the court seemingly did not rely on Bristol-Myers at all. Instead, it relied
on two Northern District of Illinois cases to reach its conclusion regarding
jurisdiction over the defendants vis-à-vis the non-Pennsylvania plaintiffs.129
The two Illinois cases did involve class actions and thus presented more
similar fact patterns.130 Still, it is odd that the court did not rely on BristolMyers at all, especially considering that it cited it earlier in the opinion.131
The significance here is: (1) the court did not explicitly extend Bristol-Myers
to class actions since it did not rely on it, and (2) at least one court, the
Northern District of Illinois, has been applying Bristol-Myers-like analysis
to class action lawsuits that predate Bristol-Myers.
In a case that was decided several weeks later, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of New York more explicitly extended Bristol-Myers
to the class action context. In Spratley v. FCA US LLC,132 the court, relying
on Bristol-Myers, granted the defendant’s 12(b)(2) motion as to the plaintiffs
whose claims were unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with New York, the

123. See Apotex Corp., 2017 WL 3129147, at *8.
124. See id. at *3.
125. See id.
126. See id. at *9.
127. See id.
128. See id. at *6.
129. See id. at *9 (citing Demedicis v. CVS Health Corp., No. 16-CV-5973, 2017 WL
569157 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2017) and Demaria v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 15c3321, 2016 WL
374145 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2016)).
130. See id.
131. Once Bristol-Myers was issued, the defendants did file a notice of supplemental
authority to alert the court that the decision supported their 12(b)(2) motion. See Defendants’
Notice of Supplemental Authority at 1, Apotex Corp., 2017 WL 3129147, ECF No. 302. The
plaintiffs’ only argument in response was that the defendants had consented to jurisdiction by
registering to do business in Pennsylvania. See Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Certain Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, Apotex Corp., 2017 WL
3129147, ECF No. 312.
132. No. 3:17-CV-0062, 2017 WL 4023348 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017).
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forum state.133 The case involved eight named plaintiffs who alleged that
Chrysler, the defendant, knowingly concealed a safety defect that was present
in several of its models.134 All but two of the named plaintiffs, however, had
no connection to New York.135 They purchased and repaired their defective
vehicles in other states.136
The Spratley court did not even address the argument that Bristol-Myers
is distinguishable in that it involved a mass action as opposed to a class
action. Rather, the court analyzed the jurisdictional aspect of the case as
though it were no different from Bristol-Myers. The court wrote:
Plaintiffs argue that the out-of-state Plaintiffs’ claims need not arise from
Chrysler’s New York activities because the out-of-state Plaintiffs’ claims
are the same as the New York Plaintiffs’ claims and arise out of Chrysler’s
nationwide activity. However, the Supreme Court recently rejected this
very theory of personal jurisdiction.
....
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Court found specific jurisdiction lacking
because there was no connection between BMS’s California contacts and
the nonresidents’ claims. Similarly, in this case, the out-of-state [named]
Plaintiffs have shown no connection between their claims and Chrysler’s
contacts with New York.137

It is true that the plaintiffs never advanced the argument that Bristol-Myers
does not extend to class actions because Bristol-Myers involved a mass
action.138 However, that should not have been significant, as the Spratley
court was aware of this argument via Justice Sotomayor’s dissent.139 What
is significant, however, is this court’s treatment of these facts as
indistinguishable from those of Bristol-Myers. In this case, the plaintiffs, like
those in Bristol-Myers, were imperiled by a defective product.140 However,
in this case, the plaintiffs proceeded procedurally through a class action
rather than a mass action.141 That said, no plaintiff in this case was physically
injured. Still, it is reasonable to think that the court here saw the arbitrariness
that might result from upholding or denying jurisdiction simply predicated
on the procedural mechanism the plaintiffs elected to employ. While this
case does not directly shed light on the extremely important question of
whether the reasoning in Bristol-Myers should be extended to unnamed class
action plaintiffs with no connection to the forum state, it does highlight this
arbitrariness consideration, which ostensibly weighs in favor of such
133. See id. at *9.
134. See id. at *1.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Id. at *6–7 (citation omitted).
138. See Plaintiffs’ Response to FCA US LLC’s Notice of Supplemental Authority in
Support of Its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Spratley, 2017 WL
4023348, ECF No. 65.
139. This is confirmed by the court’s invocation of Bristol-Myers earlier in the opinion.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140. Spratley, 2017 WL 4023348, at *1.
141. See id.
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extension, at least as to the named plaintiffs in a class action seeking money
damages.142
Eight days later, an Eastern District of New York decision suggested that
Bristol-Myers should extend to class actions, while more directly focusing
on the distinction between mass actions and class actions.143 The court
stated:
Plaintiffs attempt to side-step the due process holdings in Bristol-Myers by
arguing that the case has no effect on the law in class actions because the
case before the Supreme Court was not a class action. This argument is
flawed. The constitutional requirements of due process does [sic] not wax
and wane when the complaint is individual or on behalf of a class. Personal
jurisdiction in class actions must comport with due process just the same as
any other case.144

This case involved a group of dentists alleging that a group of distributors
acted in violation of antitrust laws and artificially raised the price of dental
supplies. The court dismissed one of the defendants from the lawsuit on the
grounds that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over that defendant,
who had practically no contacts with New York, the forum state. However,
because all the plaintiffs involved in the case resided in New York, the
lawsuit proceeded against the other defendants. Accordingly, the exact issue
in Bristol-Myers was not implicated. Still, the court’s strong language here
suggests that it would extend the Bristol-Myers holding to the class action
context.
Two days later, a district court in the Northern District of California
refused to extend Bristol-Myers. In Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple
Group,145 two named plaintiffs, both California residents, sued Dr. Pepper
on behalf of a nationwide class, alleging that Dr. Pepper intentionally
employed deceptive advertising practices by inducing people to believe its
ginger ale contained real ginger.146 Dr. Pepper, relying on Bristol-Myers,
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the non-California
class members, who independently had no connection to California as it
related to Dr. Pepper’s contacts with the state.147 The plaintiffs argued that
Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions, but only to mass actions.148
142. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that issues of law and fact predominate over the class
members’ claims, which indicates that the class here attempted to obtain 23(b)(3) certification.
143. See In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litig., No. 16 C.V. 696, 2017 WL 4217115, at *1,
*9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017).
144. Id. at *9.
145. No. 17-CV-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).
146. See id. at *1.
147. See id. at *3.
148. See id. at *5. The plaintiffs also argued that Bristol-Myers did not apply because they
were in federal court and Bristol-Myers involved a state court action, a scenario the majority
in Bristol-Myers explicitly chose not to rule on. See id. at *4. The Supreme Court in BristolMyers stated that “since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific
jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the
same restriction on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.” Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017). However, the Dr. Pepper
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The court agreed with the plaintiffs and denied Dr. Pepper’s 12(b)(2)
motion on the grounds that
[i]n a mass tort action . . . each plaintiff [is] a real party in interest to the
complaints, meaning that they [are] named as plaintiffs in the complaint.
In a putative class action, like the one before the Court, one or more
plaintiffs seek to represent the rest of the similarly situated plaintiffs, and
the “named plaintiffs” are the only plaintiffs actually named in the
complaint.149

All the named plaintiffs in this action, the court noted, were California
residents.150 As such, the court, despite recognizing that the named plaintiffs
were chosen precisely to circumvent Bristol-Myers,151 concluded that
Bristol-Myers did not extend so far.152
In so holding, the court relied in part on a separate Supreme Court case,
Devlin v. Scardelletti,153 in which the Court stated that “[n]onnamed class
members . . . may be parties for some purposes and not for others. The label
“party” does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion
about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on
context.”154 The court continued: “The Supreme Court in Devlin specified
some of these procedural rules, and all dealt with promoting expediency in
class action litigation.”155 The court ultimately decided that unnamed class
members are not parties when such status relates to personal jurisdiction.
However, the court proceeded further by noting that “[p]erhaps this may
be one of those contexts in which an unnamed class member should be
considered as [a] part[y]” because of the language the Supreme Court elected
to use in Bristol-Myers.156 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the facts in
front of it were “meaningfully distinguishable” from those in Bristol-Myers,
as each plaintiff in Bristol-Myers was a named party to the lawsuit.157
Two features of Dr. Pepper stand out: (1) the court’s recognition that
Bristol-Myers pushed substantially in the direction of granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss; and (2) its literal approach to distinguishing
between class and mass actions. The latter establishes that, had any of the
named plaintiffs been one of the non-California class members, the court
would have granted Dr. Pepper’s 12(b)(2) motion as to those plaintiffs. Thus,
this case seems consistent with Spratley, in which the court granted the
defendant’s 12(b)(2) motion on the grounds that several of the named

court rejected that argument and held that Bristol-Myers is equally applicable to federal
actions. See Dr. Pepper, 2017 WL 4224723, at *4.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id.
151. Eighty-eight percent of the class consisted of non-California residents. Id.
152. See id.
153. 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
154. See Dr. Pepper, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (alteration in original) (quoting Devlin, 536
U.S. at 9–10).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.

824

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

plaintiffs failed to satisfy the standard articulated in Bristol-Myers. Such an
implication, of course, serves as merely a hiccup for plaintiffs’ lawyers, as
they could simply select their class representatives carefully, a technique
employed by the plaintiffs’ counsel in Dr. Pepper.158 Still, such a limitation
certainly would make the class certification process at least a little more
difficult.
The implications illustrated by the former point—that is, that the court paid
homage to the Supreme Court’s diction—are potentially much larger. The
language to which the court refers, although not specified, is likely the
federalism language excerpted in Part I.A.159 The Bristol-Myers Court made
sure to emphasize the federalism concerns that would arise from enabling a
California court to exercise jurisdiction over the non-California plaintiffs.160
While it premised its decision on a “straightforward application” of specific
jurisdiction jurisprudence,161 the Court drove its constitutional due process
point home by warning that enabling jurisdiction would infringe upon the
sovereignty of other states.162 Perhaps the court in Dr. Pepper was
acknowledging that mass actions and class actions are indistinguishable in
this federalism context, while choosing nonetheless to cling to the literal
differences between the two. Or, maybe the court did perceive a palpable
distinction stemming from the fact that class actions involve unnamed
plaintiffs and mass actions do not. Whatever its motivation, the court here
did provide an extremely useful question: In light of the language used by
the Bristol-Myers Court, are class actions distinguishable from mass actions?
In other words, do the differences between class actions and mass actions
provide a basis on which to argue that exercising jurisdiction over unnamed
class members with no connection to the forum state does not infringe on the
sovereignty of other states?
The court in Dr. Pepper also cited the Supreme Court’s Devlin decision as
support for its holding. That case articulated that unnamed class members
may be considered parties to the litigation “for some purposes and not for
others.”163 The Devlin Court indicated that the main criterion when deciding
between inclusion and exclusion should be efficiency.164 Accordingly,
Devlin highlighted the efficiency objective realized by proceeding through a
class action. Devlin, then, may not be an obstacle to extending Bristol-Myers
to unnamed class members, as the Bristol-Myers Court emphatically
dismissed California’s efficiency argument and pointed instead to the
sovereignty issues that would result from allowing such an exercise of
jurisdiction.165 However, the Devlin Court was not driven by the same
federalism concern that drove the Bristol-Myers Court, since the Devlin
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002).
See id.
See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
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decision had nothing to do with personal jurisdiction, but rather with the
proper status of unnamed class members. As such, it is hard to rely too
heavily on Devlin for answers.
Dr. Pepper’s analysis was recently followed by the Eastern District of
Kentucky in Day v. Air Methods Corp.166 Day involved a class of plaintiffs
who alleged that their employer failed to adequately compensate them for the
overtime hours they worked.167 The district court judge in Day held that, at
least as to unnamed class members, extension of Bristol-Myers is not
justified.168 The court invoked both Dr. Pepper and Devlin to support its
conclusion.169
A more recent case that has examined the issue, however, seems
indistinguishable from Dr. Pepper, yet comes to a different conclusion. In
McDonnell v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC,170 the Northern District of
Illinois held that the jurisdictional analysis in Bristol-Myers does extend to
unnamed class members who have no independent connection to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state.171 In so holding, the court
explicitly relied on Bristol-Myers,172 while also acknowledging that the Dr.
Pepper court came to the opposite conclusion on similar facts.173 McDonnell
involved a class of individuals alleging a pecuniary injury inflicted by the
defendant’s deceptive advertising of its product.174 In declining to exercise
personal jurisdiction, the court explained that “[p]urchasers of [the
defendant’s] products . . . who live in Florida, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, or Washington have no injury arising from
[the defendant’s] forum-related activities in Illinois.”175 The court’s
conclusion here is unsurprising though, as Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690
Health Plan evidenced that the Northern District of Illinois had already been
applying Bristol-Myers-like analysis to the class action context.176
Yet, an even more recent decision also confronted the issue directly and
held, in line with Dr. Pepper, that Bristol-Myers should not extend to class
actions. In In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liability
Litigation,177 homeowners spanning several states brought individual actions
alleging that their Chinese-manufactured drywall emitted gasses that caused
injury.178 All of the federal actions were consolidated for pretrial
166. No. 5:17-183-DCR, 2017 WL 4781863 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 23, 2017).
167. See id. at *1.
168. See id. at *2.
169. See id. at *2 n.1.
170. No. 16C5011, 2017 WL 4864910 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017).
171. See id. at *3–4.
172. See id. at *4.
173. See id. at *4 n.7.
174. See id. at *1.
175. Id. at *4.
176. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
177. No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017).
178. Id. at *14. Mass tort cases are not typically susceptible to class action treatment. See
supra note 111 and accompanying text. However, in this case, the defendants fled the
jurisdiction of the court and thus were subjected to default judgments. In re Chinese-
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proceedings in a multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of Louisiana in
2009.179 In 2014, the court certified a 23(b)(3) class.180 Following the
issuance of Bristol-Myers, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction181 as to the nonresident class members involved in
each forum’s class action proceeding.182 In denying the motion, the court
cited Dr. Pepper for the proposition that class actions are meaningfully
distinguishable from mass tort actions and thus escape the grasp of BristolMyers.183 The court proceeded to distinguish the two types of actions by
noting the “different due process safeguards” that apply only to class
actions.184 The court further distinguished the two procedural devices by
emphasizing the stringent requirements that need to be satisfied in order to
obtain class certification, including the predominance and superiority
requirements that apply only to 23(b)(3) actions.185 The court used these
requirements to illustrate that there are bona fide differences between a
certified class and an aggregation of individuals proceeding through joinder
rules.186 Interestingly, this court implicitly went even further than the Dr.
Pepper court because all the plaintiffs involved in this case were named
parties to the lawsuit.187
The foregoing decisions illustrate that, at least shortly after Bristol-Myers,
courts are wildly divided on this issue. They also shed light on the
fundamental question at hand. If the Dr. Pepper and Chinese-Manufactured
Drywall courts’ position that there are meaningful distinctions between a
mass action group and a class action group is to be credited, Bristol-Myers
ought to be deemed inapplicable to the class action context. However, if
mass action groups are more properly perceived as indistinguishable from
class action groups with regard to personal jurisdiction and state sovereignty
concerns, as other courts have indicated, then extension of Bristol-Myers is
unavoidable.
III. ANSWERING WHETHER (AND WHERE) EXTENSION
OF BRISTOL-MYERS IS WARRANTED
Whether class actions are meaningfully distinguishable from mass actions
with respect to personal jurisdiction depends on the features of the class
action in question. Each class action type is defined by characteristics that
differentiate them. These distinctions, in turn, are important for determining

Manufactured Drywall, 2017 WL 5971622, at *14. Accordingly, liability was easily
established as to all claimants. Id.
179. See id. at *5.
180. See id. at *4.
181. See id. at *5.
182. Those forums included federal courts in Louisiana, Florida, and Virginia. See id. at
*13.
183. See id. at *12.
184. See id. at *14.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
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which class action types, if any, should be limited by Bristol-Myers. At its
core, the issue of extending Bristol-Myers centers on whether the classes
involved in each class action type are more properly perceived as individual
entities or, instead, as aggregations of individuals.
If a class of plaintiffs is properly viewed as an individual entity, like a
public corporation, then Bristol-Myers should not be deemed applicable.
When one corporation sues another corporation for the latter’s nationwide
tortious conduct, the former is able to sue in any jurisdiction in which that
conduct occurred. This is true even if some of the plaintiff-corporation’s
shareholders were injured by the defendant-corporation’s conduct in a state
other than the forum state. This result is driven by the perception of a
corporation as an individual unit. Accordingly, if a class of plaintiffs is
similarly (and properly) regarded as an individual entity, extension does not
seem warranted.
This view is arguably consistent with the Supreme Court’s Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc.188 opinion, in which the Court granted jurisdiction
over the defendant, Hustler Magazine, despite the fact that only part of the
plaintiff’s claim arose in New Hampshire, the forum state.189 In that case,
the plaintiff, a New York resident, sued Hustler for libel that arose from its
publication of stories involving the plaintiff.190 Hustler is neither
incorporated nor headquartered in New Hampshire.191 The plaintiff sued in
New Hampshire because that was the only forum in which her claim was not
time-barred,192 and the publication at issue was distributed nationally.193
Consequently, the Court stated that the “cause of action arises out of the very
activity being conducted, in part, in New Hampshire.”194 Similarly, if a class
is seen as an individual entity, the cause of action will arise, in part, in the
forum state, presuming that at least one member’s injury is connected to that
state. That said, Keeton is distinguishable in that the plaintiff was, arguably,
injured in New Hampshire, since she was, arguably, injured in every state in
which the alleged lies were spread. Further, the federalism limitation
presented by Bristol-Myers is not as implicated in Keeton since New
Hampshire has an interest in preventing the dissemination of lies about
within its borders. Again, however, the same is true of a class of plaintiffs
when the class is viewed as an individual entity, since at least a part of that
entity is harmed wherever the defendant’s injurious conduct occurs. Still,

188. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
189. See id. at 780–81. In Bristol-Myers, California also argued that Keeton supports the
exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiff. The Court rejected this assertion on the
grounds that, in Keeton, at least some of the harm to the plaintiff arose out of the defendant’s
contact with New Hampshire, the forum state. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,
137 S. Ct. 1773, 1782 (2017).
190. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 773.
193. See id. at 770.
194. Id. at 780 (emphasis added).
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Keeton provides the most liberal limits of the Court’s approach to personal
jurisdiction.195
Alternately, a class of plaintiffs can be viewed as an aggregation of
individuals, each of whom possess individual, substantive rights. Seen in
this light, Rule 23 and state equivalents merely exist as useful procedural
devices that can help individuals vindicate their rights efficiently. Class
actions allow representative litigation, but preserve the individuality of each
member’s substantive claims. Thus, if a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction was granted as to the unconnected plaintiffs in a mass
action, that same group should not be able to proceed through a class action.
Judge (then Professor) Diane Wood commented on the issue of personal
jurisdiction in class actions twenty years ago.196 In doing so, she recognized
the importance of determining whether a class is perceived as an individual
unit or instead as an aggregation of individuals.197 She also understood
(perhaps prophetically) that this distinction is crucial in light of state
She asserted that “a court’s adjudicatory
sovereignty concerns.198
jurisdiction over the different kinds of parties in class actions—named
representatives, in-state absentees, and absentees with no links to the
adjudicating forum—is a function of the cohesiveness of the class before the
court and of the representational nature of the particular class action.”199 She
believes that the more cohesive the class the more “assured we are that any
particular member who comes before the court seeking to be a class
representative will in fact be capable of satisfactorily standing in for the
absentees.”200 If a class is sufficiently cohesive, “[t]he adjudicatory
jurisdiction of the forum court to affect the right of absentees is a function of
the court’s power to affect the representative before it.”201 Conversely,
Wood believes that if a class contains important differences among the
represented individuals, the class is more properly regarded as an aggregation
of individuals and therefore personal jurisdiction must be evaluated as to each
class member.202 Thus, Wood would reject a one-size-fits-all approach and
instead take a nuanced approach to the question of whether Bristol-Myers
should extend to the class action context. Indeed, such an approach seems
appropriate in light of the significant distinctions among the different class
types.

195. See Andrews, supra note 15, at 1369 (“A policy analysis of Keeton shows that its
holding already stretched the justifications for jurisdiction . . . .”).
196. See generally Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND.
L.J. 597 (1987).
197. See id. at 598–99.
198. See id. at 604.
199. Id. at 598–99.
200. Id. at 601.
201. Id. at 605.
202. See id. at 601–05.
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A. Bristol-Myers’s Applicability to 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) Actions
Rule 23(b)(1) governs “incompatible-standards” and “limited-fund” class
actions, which involve individual claims that “are so intertwined that class
adjudication is essential.”203 For example, using the “incompatible
standards” bond example, imagine if one court declared a municipal bond
void in one individual action and another court declared the same bond valid
in a separate individual action.204 The municipality is left having no clue
how to act.205 These incompatible judgments make the class action device
not only seem preferable but necessary for effective resolution.206 In effect,
then, a 23(b)(1)(A) class cannot be disaggregated. Accordingly, it is no
surprise that in 23(b)(1)(A) class actions there is generally neither a notice
requirement nor an opportunity for an unnamed class member to opt out.207
The same is true of 23(b)(1)(B) class actions. In a limited-fund case,
proceeding individually will create a “race to the courthouse,” as the
defendant would only have the ability to compensate a limited number of
individuals.208 However, under 23(b)(1)(B), every harmed individual in the
class can be compensated according to her pro rata share. As such, allowing
class members to opt out of such an action would undermine the purpose of
having this category in the first place, namely, to ensure that claimants get
their fair share.209 The formation of a class in limited-fund situations, then,
also provides the only means by which a group of individuals is able to
vindicate its substantive rights.210
After considering the characteristics of 23(b)(1) class actions, it seems
necessary to conclude that a class certified under this category is more
properly perceived as an individual entity. In fact, it makes little sense to
view these class actions differently. The precise reason these types of class
actions exist is to avoid individuals contradicting (in incompatible-standards
actions) or usurping (in limited-fund actions) other individuals’ rights. In
these class actions, the members’ claims are “so intertwined” that it is
essential for their claims to become one. To use Judge Wood’s words, these
classes are sufficiently cohesive to assure “that any particular member who
comes before the court seeking to be a class representative will in fact be
capable of satisfactorily standing in for the absentees.”211
Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated its agreement with this perception
through its decision to make notice and opt-out rights discretionary and, as

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:2 (emphasis added).
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:2.
See id.
See id.
See id. § 4:16.
See id.
Wood, supra note 196, at 601; see also supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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to opt-out rights, often forbidden in 23(b)(1) proceedings.212 While 23(b)(3)
money-damage class actions mandate provision of such rights to comport
with due process, the same due process concern does not manifest itself in
23(b)(1) class actions.213 The reason for this is clear: individuals’ due
process rights are not threatened by 23(b)(1) proceedings because 23(b)(1)
proceedings involve situations in which the class mechanism is the only way
to reasonably take action. The only way to achieve satisfactory resolution of
a 23(b)(1) issue is for a class to form and proceed together as one. The class
members’ claims are inextricably linked. No class member is foregoing an
alternative to proceed individually because the claims can only successfully
exist together. Thus, this constitutional due process concern is not
implicated. Nor is the Bristol-Myers Court’s federalism concern because,
under the “entity” characterization, the class is injured in any state in which
one of its members is injured. In other words, the class’s claim arises in any
state in which the defendant’s contacts injured any portion of the class.
However, 23(b)(1) class actions are the least utilized type.214 One
explanation for this grounds itself in the Rule’s due process approach.215 As
mentioned, the Supreme Court has held that class actions involving money
damages require notice and opt-out rights for unnamed class members.216
Consequently, 23(b)(1) class actions that are not of the limited-fund variety
are generally limited to actions seeking injunctive relief, since notice and optout rights are inconsistent with the nature of 23(b)(1) classes.217 Injunctive
relief class actions, however, typically take the form of 23(b)(2) class
actions.218
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, or “injunctive” class actions, however, are
defined by similarly unitary characteristics. As the Supreme Court itself
noted, 23(b)(2) classes are defined by their “indivisible nature” and
“the notion that the [defendant’s] conduct is such that it can be enjoined or
declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”
In other words, Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or
declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It
does not authorize class certification when each individual class member
would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against
the defendant. Similarly, it does not authorize class certification when each
member would be entitled to an individualized award of money
damages.219
212. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 361–
62 (2011) (labeling 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) “mandatory” classes and noting that “the Rule
provides no opportunity for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members to opt out”).
213. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 363.
214. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:2.
215. See id.
216. See id.; supra note 212 and accompanying text.
217. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:2.
218. See id.
219. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360–61 (2011) (citation omitted)
(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
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Class certification is only appropriate in 23(b)(2) actions when a decision to
enjoin or permit the defendant’s allegedly harmful conduct as to an individual
would necessarily affect the class as a whole.220 Accordingly, here, as in
23(b)(1) class actions, “unitary adjudication is not only preferable, but it is
also essential.”221 Unsurprisingly, in 23(b)(2) class actions, as in 23(b)(1)
class actions, notice need not be provided, and the opportunity to opt out is
generally not afforded.222 Again, the law acknowledges the entity-like feel
of 23(b)(2) classes and, accordingly, understands that the due process
concerns implicated by the class action device are not as present in these
“injunctive” classes.
As indicated earlier, this type of class action is commonly employed in
civil and constitutional rights cases.223 However, since only injunctive relief
is sought in these actions, the following question might sometimes arise:
Why would a plaintiff bother going through the class certification process if
she is just seeking to enjoin a certain defendant’s conduct?224 If she wins an
individual suit, while the outcome would certainly affect individuals not
involved in the action (making certification appropriate), the court
nonetheless would enjoin the defendant’s wrongful conduct, so why endure
the extra hurdles presented by the class certification process?225
The answer to these questions manifests itself in the mootness point made
earlier when class action objectives were discussed.226 Take the famous civil
rights class action case, Brown v. Board of Education.227 In that case, if the
named plaintiff, Linda Brown, proceeded individually, she would likely have
graduated school well before resolution of her case, thereby causing her
claim to be moot.228 However, because the mootness doctrine does not apply
to class action lawsuits as long as someone in the class has a justiciable
claim,229 an injunctive class action allowed Linda Brown to vindicate her
rights.230 This mootness rule magnifies the 23(b)(2) class’s “entity” status.
On one hand, this mootness rule can be viewed as yet another constitutional
exception applicable to class action lawsuits.231 This exception would read
something like: class actions are an exception to Article III’s “case-orcontroversy” requirement. Or, this mootness rule can be viewed not as a
220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:26.
221. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:26; see also Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361–62 (“Classes
certified under (b)(1) and (b)(2) share the most traditional justifications for class treatment—
that individual adjudications would be impossible or unworkable, as in a (b)(1) class, or that
the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at once, as in a (b)(2) class.”).
222. See supra note 212.
223. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
224. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:26.
225. See id.
226. See id.; supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
227. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
228. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:26.
229. See 1 id. § 1:8.
230. See 2 id. § 4:26. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
231. Class actions provide an exception to the due-process-driven rule that all people bound
by the resolution of a lawsuit must be named parties to that suit. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
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constitutional exception but as consistent both with the Constitution and with
the view that 23(b)(2) classes are individual units, comprised of many
individual parts, but capable of legal action only as a whole. In this light, the
class’s claim is justiciable, as the class still has many controversies in need
of a remedy. Thus, the mootness “exception” is not exceptional at all.
Additionally, a plaintiff like Linda Brown might seek class certification
because the scope of relief expands as more people join a 23(b)(2) action.232
If Linda Brown had won an individual action, it is possible that only her
school would have been desegregated.233 However, by representing all of
the black students in her community, Linda Brown desegregated an entire
school district.234 This relationship between class size and remedy size again
elucidates the unified persona that defines 23(b)(2) actions. The larger a
23(b)(2) class grows, the greater the remedial impact an injunction will have.
This effect is a product of the inseparability of each member’s claim. As the
unified claim grows in magnitude, so, too, does the impact of the court’s
resolution.
Moreover, 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes fully embody the representative
litigation that Rule 23 was created to establish. Using Judge Wood’s
approach, these class action types are both sufficiently cohesive and truly
representational.235 The necessity of employing these class types in certain
situations ensures that the named plaintiff or plaintiffs in these actions
genuinely are standing in for the absentees. Any class member could serve
as the named plaintiff without altering the substance or structure of the
lawsuit. Referring back to the corporation analogy, shareholders may sell
their shares to new owners, but the company’s operations remain the same.
The foregoing reasons illustrate why Bristol-Myers should not extend to
23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class actions (or to analogous state class actions) that
seek to avoid incompatible results, involve limited-fund defendants, or seek
injunctive relief. These classes are more properly regarded as individual
entities. Accordingly, when any part of that unit is harmed by the defendant’s
contacts with a particular state, that state presents a constitutionally sound
forum.
B. Bristol-Myers’s Applicability to 23(b)(3) Actions
Finally, there is the 23(b)(3), or “money-damage” class action. While the
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions present situations in which the individual
class members are inextricably linked, the members in a money-damage class
“typically are not so intertwined.”236 Rather, money-damage class actions
serve to promote efficiency by consolidating the claims of several similarly
situated individuals.237 Unlike the other types of class actions, then, the
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:26.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:47.
See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
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formation of a 23(b)(3) class is not essential for effective resolution. In
money-damage class actions, each individual could initiate her own claim
individually and be entitled to the same remedy as that which she could
obtain through a class action.238 Furthermore, the individual class members
in money-damage class actions are often entitled to varying amounts of
compensation upon a favorable resolution.239 There is, accordingly, not as
strong a feeling of interconnectedness among the members in 23(b)(3)
proceedings. Indeed, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure acknowledged as much when it wrote that “class-action treatment
is not as clearly called for” in 23(b)(3) class actions.240 As such, it is harder
to argue for the “entity” perception when evaluating 23(b)(3) class actions.
However, as earlier explained, one of the central objectives of class actions
is to enable people to obtain compensation for small claims that would be
inefficient to pursue as individual actions.241 This objective is attained
through the use of 23(b)(3) money-damage classes.242 Not only does
proceeding through a 23(b)(3) class action ensure compensation for a group
of individuals who would not otherwise be made whole, but, as also noted
earlier, it has the effect of deterring the wrongdoer’s harmful conduct.243
Thus, in these small-claim 23(b)(3) class actions, as in 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2)
actions, the class mechanism can be seen as essential for the attainment of a
remedy. The same cannot be said of mass tort actions, like the one in BristolMyers, in which many of the claimants sought damages that would also be
worth seeking in an individual action.244
Still, the reality is that small-claim money-damage class actions feasibly
could be brought as several individual claims; it would just be incredibly
inefficient for any individual plaintiff to do so. Consequently, even these
23(b)(3) class actions are grounded in efficiency concerns. Thus, the
question of Bristol-Myers’s extension to 23(b)(3) class actions does not
warrant as clear of an answer. And while it is true that small-claim 23(b)(3)
cases accomplish beneficial deterrent and compensatory objectives, such
benefits would not be eliminated by the extension of Bristol-Myers. Rather,
these benefits would simply be limited to realization in either the defendant’s
home state, or in a forum in which the defendant’s contacts with the state
give rise to each member’s claim.
There is, however, something to be said about undermining 23(b)(3)’s
efficiency objective. Extending Bristol-Myers to 23(b)(3) actions would
make it hard for plaintiffs to form voluminous classes. In situations where a
defendant’s wrongdoing injures a class of people nationwide, the only forum
238. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:49.
239. See id. § 4:54.
240. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
241. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
242. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:47.
243. See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text.
244. This proposition is supported by the fact that the underlying case in Bristol-Myers
proceeded as a mass tort action which, unlike a class action, does not serve to enable smallclaim plaintiffs to obtain compensation.
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in which a nationwide class action could likely proceed is a state in which
the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction. Such a severe obstacle will
make it difficult for these classes to form and will increase the likelihood of
creating a series of lawsuits as opposed to a single class action.
Consequently, the objective of achieving “economies of time, effort, and
expense”245 (i.e., the efficiency objective) would be greatly mitigated. One
could argue that mass actions are similarly available to promote efficiency.246
This argument, as it relates to the Bristol-Myers holding, would proceed by
noting that the efficiency benefits of mass actions were explicitly subjugated
by the Court in favor of federalism concerns. As such, the argument would
conclude, the same reasoning should apply to money-damage class actions.
Yet, the efficiency accomplishments of mass actions are not as substantial
as those of class actions.247 The extent to which efficiency is more
substantially achieved in 23(b)(3) class actions than mass actions is
highlighted by the predominance requirement. Because “questions of law or
fact . . . [must] predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members,”248 the 23(b)(3) class action guarantees an efficient result. Mass
actions, on the other hand, while always involving some common issues of
law and fact, often involve plaintiffs whose individual cases differ
significantly from one another.249 These differences, in turn, require
additional and particularized litigation, thereby mitigating the mass action’s
economical objective.250
Still, it is hard to avoid that Bristol-Myers explicitly dismissed efficiency
concerns by highlighting federalism concerns. After all, extension of BristolMyers still permits class actions in defendants’ home states. Moreover, since
only the named plaintiffs are required to litigate in class actions, the burden
of litigating in the defendant’s home state is much lighter than would be in a
mass action, in which all the plaintiffs are named. Thus, the argument for
not extending Bristol-Myers can only be won by illustrating that 23(b)(3)
class actions do not encounter the same federalism obstacle as mass tort
actions. Arguing that class actions achieve greater efficiency than mass
actions and, therefore, that Bristol-Myers should be stopped in its tracks, does
just the opposite.
Furthermore, 23(b)(3) class actions do not always involve an aggregation
of individuals with de minimis claims. Sometimes they involve an
aggregation of claimants who each individually are seeking a substantial
monetary award from a defendant.251 In these cases, procedural efficiency
does seem to be the driving rationale behind proceeding through a class
action.252 Accordingly, it is harder to distinguish these class action types
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
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from the Bristol-Myers-like mass actions, which also ground themselves in
an efficiency rationale.
However, the 23(b)(3) predominance requirement does not only further
efficiency aims, it also promotes uniformity in the law, the other central
purpose of a 23(b)(3) action.253 The predominance requirement presents a
high threshold that needs to be met in order to get a money-damage class
action certified. Requiring “questions of law or fact common to class
members [to] predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members”254 ensures that members of a 23(b)(3) class are similarly situated
to a high degree, which, in turn, promotes consistency in the law by resolving
the similarly situated claims the same way. If each member of a 23(b)(3)
class were to proceed individually, there is a significant chance that the
similarly situated cases would be resolved by contradictory judgments. One
court might set precedent X while another court sets precedent Y on
substantially identical claims. Indeed, the predominance requirement is
“meant to assess whether the class’s interests are sufficiently cohesive to
warrant adjudication by representation.”255 The same sense of cohesion is
not as sought-after in mass actions. The risk of having inconsistency in the
law by disassembling a mass action is not nearly as great, as different
outcomes are often justifiable because claimants often present key factual
differences among their respective cases.256 On the other hand, forcing a
23(b)(3) class to disassemble and litigate separately does risk inconsistency
in the law, as the initial formation of the class required each individual’s
claim to be governed by predominantly the same legal and factual disputes.
Whether the Bristol-Myers Court’s federalism concern trumps this legal
inconsistency problem is a closer question.
Naturally, the contention arises that, in Bristol-Myers, California premised
its specific jurisdiction argument on the fact that the claims of the nonresident
plaintiffs were identical to those of the California plaintiffs: the nonresident
plaintiffs, like the California plaintiffs, ingested and were subsequently
injured by Plavix.257 The Court, of course, rejected this argument.258
Therefore, it can be argued that extension to 23(b)(3) class actions is
warranted even in the face of 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.
Yet, California could not argue that inconsistency in the law might flow
from the Court’s decision to deny personal jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs’
cases likely involved significant distinctions, including different Plavixinflicted injuries and varying levels of causation evidence.259 This makes
sense in light of the fact that a key distinguishing factor between mass actions
253. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
254. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
255. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
256. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
259. The underlying action in Bristol-Myers involved nearly 700 individuals, each of
whom were likely prescribed varying doses, had distinct medical histories, and were injured
to varying degrees.
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and 23(b)(3) class actions is the latter’s predominance requirement, which,
again, serves to promote uniformity in the law.
However, the Spratley court seemingly was not affected by the
distinguishing effect of the predominance requirement. Although that court
did not explicitly address Bristol-Myers’s extension to class actions, it did
invoke Bristol-Myers to grant the defendant’s 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.260
Above, it was conjectured that such dismissal might have been predicated on
an arbitrariness concern—namely, that upholding jurisdiction would allow
plaintiffs like these to proceed through a class action when a mass action
would be barred by Bristol-Myers. Accordingly, proceeding through a class
action would have the effect of providing these plaintiffs with a procedural
loophole.
Yet, the fact that plaintiffs may sometimes choose between proceeding
through a mass action or class action does not provide a procedural loophole
as much as it speaks to the selectiveness of a 23(b)(3) class action. The
predominance requirement decides which groups of people can proceed
through a class action. Often, the members of a 23(b)(3) class could have
proceeded through a mass action, but not vice versa. It is more appropriate
to form a 23(b)(3) class when the same issues of law and fact predominate
over each individual claim. The reverse is not true—most mass actions do
not meet the requirements needed to proceed through a class action. Thus,
there is no arbitrariness in not extending Bristol-Myers to money-damage
class actions because the predominance requirement serves to meaningfully
distinguish a class-action-qualified group from a mass-action-qualified one.
The ability to qualify for class certification speaks to the nature of a particular
group of individuals—one that is inherently more cohesive than a group
unable to obtain such certification. Conversely, a group that is too dominated
by particularized facts cannot be properly regarded as a class.
Another telling distinction is that class actions are rarely appropriate in the
personal injury context.261 The only instance in which class certification is
sometimes warranted is when the injuries arise from a single occurrence,
such as the collapse of the Hyatt skywalk.262 Again, this illustrates the
natural distinction between class action and mass action groups. When
several injuries occur as the result of an isolated occurrence, the issues of law
and fact will generally predominate over each individual’s claim, as there are
no major discrepancies as to the manner in which the individuals were
harmed. Using the skywalk example, each individual was injured at the exact
same time, in the exact same place, by the exact same accident. That can
easily be contrasted with the injuries associated with Bristol-Myers. There,
important differences like dosage and medical and personal history served to
individualize each person’s claim. This distinction between these two types
of personal injury cases exemplifies the predominance requirement as an

260. See supra notes 133, 137 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
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effective mechanism used to only qualify groups that are sufficiently
cohesive.
Still, as the Dr. Pepper and Day courts explicitly addressed, and as the
Spratley court implicitly acknowledged, there seems to be a difference
between extending the Bristol-Myers holding to class actions in which
unnamed class members cannot establish specific (or general) jurisdiction
and extending Bristol-Myers in class actions in which some of the named
plaintiffs cannot establish personal jurisdiction. In the former situation, Dr.
Pepper and Day do not view extension as warranted or proper.263 In the latter
situation, all three courts seem to think extension is appropriate.264 After all,
every plaintiff in a mass action is named and the Bristol-Myers Court clearly
denied jurisdiction to the plaintiffs with claims unrelated to the forum state.
However, to distinguish on these grounds is to diminish the more meaningful
distinction between money-damage class actions and mass actions—namely,
the greater cohesion among those involved in the former as well as the
former’s more substantial promotion of legal consistency. Distinguishing
between named and unnamed class members undermines the essence of the
23(b)(3) class because it suggests that the primary way to distinguish class
actions from mass actions is by acknowledging that the former involves
representatives, while the latter does not. While this is still a meaningful
distinction, it does not as sensibly warrant paralyzing Bristol-Myers in light
of the Court’s federalism language. However, the named-unnamed
distinction is the more palpable one, as it allows courts to grab onto a concrete
difference between the two forms of litigation.
However, relying on the differences between what lies at the core of mass
actions and class actions might be viewed as an exercise in abstraction.
Judges are asked to make law according to established legal principles; the
more concrete distinction allows them to do so here. However, to really
illustrate how 23(b)(3) class actions do not implicate the federalism concern
focused on by the Bristol-Myers Court, the named-unnamed distinction
might be better seen as a product of the differences in nature between mass
and class actions. In other words, the greater sense of cohesion in the former
enables a unique type of litigation—representative litigation—that
concretely projects the differences between the two types of lawsuits through
the unnamed-named distinction. Still, as Judge Wood noted, a forum state’s
ability to exercise jurisdiction over the unnamed members of a sufficiently
cohesive class “is a function of the court’s power to affect the representative
before it.”265 Thus, as indicated by the judges in Spratley and Dr. Pepper,
class representatives—that is, named parties in a class action—must satisfy
the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Bristol-Myers.
Still, the due process constraints that limit only 23(b)(3) actions seemingly
weigh in favor of extension of Bristol-Myers to both named and unnamed
class members. To remain consistent with the Due Process Clause, provision
263. See supra notes 150–52, 168 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 137, 149–52, 168 and accompanying text.
265. Wood, supra note 196, at 605.
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of notice and opt-out rights to all class members in a money-damage class
This requirement serves to highlight the
action is mandatory.266
constitutional due process concerns that arise in 23(b)(3) actions as compared
to the other class action types, which do not mandate provision of notice or
opt-out rights.267 As the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes268
stated:
[Rule 23(b)(2)] does not require that class members be given notice and
opt-out rights, presumably because it is thought (rightly or wrongly) that
notice has no purpose when the class is mandatory, and that depriving
people of their right to sue in this manner complies with the Due Process
Clause. In the context of a class action predominantly for money damages
we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process.269

Due to the fact that 23(b)(3) classes, unlike the other class types, are not
essential to afford claimants proper relief, “an individual litigant can pursue
her own money damage action without affecting other similarly situated
parties.”270 As such, the members of 23(b)(3) classes need to be given
minimal due process rights, namely, notice of the lawsuit and an opportunity
to opt out.271 In 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions, conversely, these
requirements are absent because of the classes’ individualized nature.272
Since the only way to obtain an effective remedy in these class action types
is through the formation of a class, notice and opt-out rights are not seen as
necessary.273 Thus, the Due Process Clause here serves to distinguish
23(b)(3) class actions with more of an aggregate feel than an “entity” class
action.
Furthermore, as Professor Carol Rice Andrews noted years before BristolMyers tightened the specific jurisdiction doctrine, the Constitution (and the
Court’s interpretation of it) conceivably does limit jurisdiction in nationwide
class actions in which certain class members have no connection to the forum
state—or, what Andrews terms the “problem class action.”274 In illustrating
her point, Andrews relies on Shutts.275 Specifically, she highlights the
Court’s choice-of-law analysis, an area that is also governed by the Due
Process Clause but is less constitutionally stringent because it does not
require the defendant to have purposely availed itself of the forum state.276
Instead, for a state’s choice-of-law rules to be applied, “that State must have
a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See supra notes 43, 69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
Id. at 363.
2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:49.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts III.A–B.
See supra Parts III.A–B.
See Andrews, supra note 15, at 1349.
See id. at 1370–74.
See id. at 1373.

2018]

TOTALLY CLASS-LESS?

839

unfair.”277 In Shutts, the Court held that Kansas, the forum state, could not
apply its choice-of-law rules to the claims of the class members whose cases
did not arise out of the defendant’s contacts with Kansas.278 Here, then, the
formation of a class did not except the members with claims unrelated to the
forum state from the constitutional limitations of the Due Process Clause.
Andrews argued:
The same conclusion can apply to personal jurisdiction. If the relationship
between the claims of the unnamed class members and the forum were
insufficient to meet the test for choice of law, then it seemingly would be
insufficient to meet the more demanding due process test for personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.279

However, the choice-of-law inquiry is often explored after personal
jurisdiction has been established.280 Indeed, the choice-of-law limitation
serves as a constitutional safeguard for situations in which personal
jurisdiction has been established in the forum state, but the forum state does
not serve as the optimal state for choice of law, as was the case in Shutts
itself.281 Accordingly, choice-of-law due process concerns actually help to
mitigate the federalism concern of failing to extend Bristol-Myers to class
actions.
Yet, Judge Wood indicated that specific jurisdiction ought to only be
asserted over a defendant opposing a class if: (1) specific jurisdiction can
properly be exercised as to each class member individually, or (2) the class
is of the “purely representational variety.”282 Judge Wood argued that
23(b)(3) classes that involve too many differences among the individual
members—such as differences in “interest, stake, or motivation”283—
conform more squarely to the joinder model, that is, the model in which
several individuals use Rule 20 (or a state equivalent) to aggregate their
claims, as was the case in Bristol-Myers.284 However, classes that involve
these differences should not, with the proper scrutiny, be able to obtain class
certification in the first place. Nevertheless, if they do obtain certification,
due to a lack of scrutiny or difficulty in ascertaining predominance at the
filing stage, there are ex post measures to remedy the error.285
Either way, the case remains that a group of individuals with a mass tort
claim against a particular defendant cannot simply circumvent the personal
jurisdiction obstacle created by Bristol-Myers by proceeding as a class. To
277. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
278. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
279. Andrews, supra note 15, at 1373.
280. Personal jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, since the defendant is seen to have
consented if she does not immediately object. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
281. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821 (“[W]hile a State may, for reasons we have previously
stated, assume jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs whose principal contacts are with other
States, it may not use this assumption of jurisdiction as an added weight in the scale when
considering the permissible constitutional limits on choice of substantive law.”).
282. See Wood, supra note 196, at 617–18.
283. See id. at 603.
284. See id. at 623–24.
285. See id. at 601.
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do so would require the group to satisfy the predominance requirement.286
And, as already explained, the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers-like actions are not
able to do so.287 Indeed, “the predominance requirement . . . precludes
certification in most mass tort personal injury cases.”288 Thus, the
predominance requirement has the effect of distinguishing the actual nature
of money-damage mass actions and money-damage class actions. Failing to
extend Bristol-Myers, then, facilitates realization of 23(b)(3)’s objective: to
enable a certain type of group to proceed through representative litigation—
more specifically, a group that is defined by predominantly the same issues
of law and fact.
Finally, class actions, unlike mass actions, are governed by a rule that was
created to establish an equitable exception to the constitutional limitation of
individuals being bound only by actions to which they are a party in the
traditional sense (i.e., a named party).289 Mass actions, conversely, comport
with this constitutional limitation.290 The very core of a class action, then, is
constitutionally exceptional. Thus, to except class actions from the
federalism language of Bristol-Myers seems justifiable.
In Amchem, which involved a putative 23(b)(3) class action, the Court
noted that Rule 23(b)’s “dominant concern” is ensuring that “the proposed
class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by
decisions of class representatives.”291 If a court certifies a class, then, it
inherently acknowledges the group’s unique level of cohesiveness. Seen
another way, similar to the mootness exception, this due process exception is
not genuinely exceptional, but rather consistent with the notion that classes
are properly perceived as individual units and, thus, the absent class members
are fully present through their representatives. An injury to any individual in
the class represents an injury to a portion of the class itself. Accordingly, if
the class representative satisfies the jurisdictional requirements, so do the
absent class members.
Yet the Court has made clear that in 23(b)(3) actions this due process
concern is significant.292 However, this concern is addressed through
23(b)(3)’s provision of a middle ground: rather than require individuals to
affirmatively opt into the action (as due process would mandate in any other
type of nonclass action), absent class members must be given the opportunity
to affirmatively opt out.293 This middle ground can only be regarded as
constitutionally appropriate if 23(b)(3) classes are sufficiently cohesive and
representational; if they are, a court’s jurisdictional reach over the absentees
286. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
287. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
288. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:54.
289. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985); supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
290. As stated earlier, every party in a mass action is named. See supra notes 102, 106 and
accompanying text.
291. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
292. See supra notes 266–70 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 43, 69 and accompanying text.
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will be a function of its reach over the representative before it. The
predominance requirement achieves this aim.
In sum, while the
predominance requirement might not rise to the level of awarding 23(b)(3)
classes with the same “entity” status as the other types of class action, it does
enough to protect it from Bristol-Myers.
CONCLUSION
The Bristol-Myers Court was clear about the contours of the personal
jurisdiction doctrine and how it applied to the facts at hand. The nonCalifornian plaintiffs could not survive a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction because general jurisdiction could not be asserted over
BMS, and the non-Californian plaintiffs’ claims did not arise out of BMS’s
contacts with California. To hold otherwise, the Court emphasized, would
infringe upon the sovereignty of the states that did represent an appropriate
forum for the non-California residents. The Court, as Justice Sotomayor
crossly noted, left open the question of whether its decision would extend to
class actions. Thus, this Note principally examined whether class actions are
sufficiently distinguishable from mass actions so that the Court’s federalism
concern is not implicated. For 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) actions, the answer
came more easily: the unified and essential nature of these actions precluded
extension of Bristol-Myers. Rule 23(b)(3) actions, on the other hand,
presented a closer question. However, the requirements that are needed to
form 23(b)(3) classes, namely, the predominance and superiority
requirements, elevate 23(b)(3) classes above Bristol-Myers’s reach. Without
them, 23(b)(3) actions would be too similar to mass actions to survive
Bristol-Myers. Similar to how they permit a middle ground to satisfy due
process concerns, these unifying requirements do enough to evade BristolMyers concerns as well. Perhaps a middle ground in this context as well is
imminent. For now, though, the class action should remain unscathed.

